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BOOK REVIEWS 
Problems oj Religious Pluralism, by John Hick. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1985. Pp. x and 148. $19.95. 
JOSEPH RUNZO, Chapman College, California. 
This is the best book available for a concise account of the impressive systematic 
epistemology of religion which John Hick has developed over the past decade. 
Bringing together important recent essays, it displays the remarkable scope and 
integration of issues-from religious pluralism, and the nature of religion and 
religious experience, to epistemic claims about the divine Reality and the post-
ulation of life after death-which constitute the broad scheme of Hick's innovative 
system. (A more detailed account is forthcoming, in An Interpretation ojReligion, 
based on Hick's 1986 Gifford Lectures.) In order to assess this broader scheme, 
I will treat the essays as a whole rather than individually. 
Following the lead of Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Hick rejects the notion that a 
religion is fundamentally a set of beliefs, suggesting instead that religion defini-
tively concerns the transformation of human existence from "self-centeredness 
to Reality-centeredness." The key issue which Hick addresses, then, is the ques-
tion of the relation between the diverse religious traditions of humankind and 
this shared telos of "salvation/liberation." Centrally, Hick proposes that the 
apparently conflicting truth-claims of the world's religions can be reconciled in 
a manner which preserves the integrity of each while understanding all traditions 
as constituting (varied) responses to one transcendent divine Reality. 
Hick identifies three possible views of the relation between diverse religious 
traditions and salvation/liberation: the "exclusivist" view that only one particular 
mode of religion (one's own) is valid; the "inclusivist" position that only one's 
own tradition is wholly correct but that this proper path to salvation/liberation 
is partially reflected in other traditions; and the "pluralist" conception that the 
transformation from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness is taking place, 
though in different ways, within each of the great religious traditions. 
Hick argues for pluralism. On the basis of what he regards as strong cumulative 
trans-historical and cross-cultural evidence, he begins with the "basic religious 
conviction" that religious experience and conception do involve a transcendent 
divine Reality. To this two theses are added. Hick employs the Kantian distinction 
between the Real an sich and the Real as humanly experienced, together with 
the Kantian notion that all experience, and so all religious experience, is concep-
tualized-is, in Wittgensteinian terms, experiencing-as. He concludes that the 
specific forms of religious awareness in the world's religions are experiences of 
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the one Ultimate Reality, which come to consciousness in tenns of the religious 
concepts, perspectives, attitudes etc. of each individual's own tradition: as divine 
personae (e.g., Yahweh, Allah, etc.) for theists and as divine impersonae (e.g., 
Brahman, the Dhanna, the Tao etc.) for non-theists. 
In order to achieve this bold, unifying conception of the world religions and 
accompanying perspicuous solution to their apparently conflicting truth-claims, 
Hick emphasizes the telic, salvific aspect of religion and de-emphasizes the 
propositional content of religious belief. But this raises an internal conflict within 
Hick's scheme. For by diminishing the significance of belief, Hick inadvertently 
weakens both the motivation and means for pursuing the religious life as a way 
to salvation/liberation. Several related difficulties in Hick's general program 
illustrate this. 
(1) Hick argues that the beliefs of different religious traditions can only be 
judged against each other in tenns of the efficaciousness for salvation/liberation 
of holding the respective beliefs. In part this is an attempt to avoid exclusivism 
by obviating the truth-claims of religion. So as a salient example, he denies that 
the doctrine of the Incarnation can mean that Jesus exclusively represents the 
divine Reality. This makes it easier to reconcile the Christian notion of a personal 
God with that of a non-personal Absolute. But as important as such an attempt 
is, perhaps no effective reconciliation among world religions is possible here. 
Perhaps it is precisely the specific propositional content of religion which is 
essential for the understanding of, and as a guide to, salvation/liberation. For it 
would seem that the more one excises specific doctrines from religion, the more 
specific reasons for, and specific direction toward, a religious path to salvation 
are eliminated. It is at least an open question whether the Christian can find the 
same significance and direction in his or her life if Jesus is .not regarded as the 
Son of God, as if he is. 
In the same vein, the ontological status of the divine personae and impersonae 
is left unclear. If they are more than mere projections of the human mind, what 
more are they? Is the God of Christianity, for example (a divine persona), 
causally efficacious in the natural order? True, the more we insist that a specific 
metaphysical content for the idea of God, or Brahman, or Dharma, is indispens-
able, the less likely it will appear that they are manifestations of one and the 
same divine Reality. But without a specific idea of the ontological status of these 
personae and impersonae, the religious person will be left without a clear con-
ception of and religious guide to the end goal of salvation/liberation. Further, 
as the specific propositional significance of doctrines is diminished, the impetus 
for religious skepticism is increased. 
(2) Another difficulty with Hick's suggestion that the test of religious beliefs 
can only be pragmatic because their significance is soteriological is this. Whatever 
BOOK REVIEWS 317 
their ultimate significance, religious beliefs, like any system of belief, can and 
should be assessed on the basis of their internal coherence, explanatory power, 
comprehensiveness, and so on. Indeed, on Hick's own Kantian account, religious 
experiences, which are the proper basis for religious belief and the religious life, 
are themselves inextricably conceptualized and hence subject to the canons of 
coherence, etc. Moreover, as one takes religious pluralism seriously, it becomes 
all the more important to assess the coherence and comprehensiveness of one's 
own tradition vis-a-vis the conceptions (and experiences) of others in other 
traditions. 
(3) Hick suggests that differences of belief are "of great philosophical impor-
tance as elements within our respective theories about the universe; but they are 
not of great religious, i.e. soteriological, importance." For, he adds, "different 
groups can hold incompatible sets of theories all of which constitute intellectual 
frameworks within which the process of salvation/liberation can proceed." (p. 
94) But from the fact that different, even incompatible, theories can guide 
individuals to the same end, of course it does not follow that every theory can 
guide individuals to that end. Even more so, it does not follow that one can 
reach that end without any theory. Quite the contrary, the cognitive content of 
religion is essential for providing a unified view of the universe and a coherent 
basis for action which could lead one to salvation/liberation. 
(4) Hick argues for the reasonableness of holding the "basic religious convic-
tion" within all the world religions-i.e. that religious belief and practice do 
refer to a divine reality-and he postulates the existence of one transcendent 
divine Reality (noumenal), to which all religions refer, on the basis of induction 
from religious experience. (p. 106) Again, this unified conception is achieved 
by discounting apparently conflicting truth-claims among religions. Yet just 
insofar as the specificity of religious doctrine is de-emphasized, the possibility 
that the basic religious conviction is universally well-founded and the postulation 
of a noumenal divine Reality become less plausible. For as we make our hypoth-
eses about the nature of reality more indefinite, we do not thereby increase the 
available inductive evidence. Rather, the experiential evidence for an indefinite 
hypothesis becomes correspondingly ambiguous. Moreover, on Hick's own Kan-
tian epistemology, what will count as inductive evidence for a transcendent 
divine Reality will depend in part on the conceptual resources of the percipient. 
Hence, either substantive content needs to be retained in religious beliefs so that 
it is clear to the religious person what his or her experience is evidence for, or 
religious experience, specifying little, will be evidence for little. 
However, while this conflict within his system needs to be resolved, Hick's 
innovative epistemology of religion has clear strengths. First, he has broadened 
the discussion of issues central to the Judeo-Christian tradition to the wider 
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context of the world religions. He makes a provocative case that despite the 
plethora of rituals, attitudes, and theologies, the world religions do point toward 
the same transcendent Reality. And by emphasizing similar rather than disparate 
features among religions, Hick provides a potent argument against a naive and 
close-minded religious imperialism about one's own tradition. 
Second, even as Hick reinterprets some elements of traditional orthodoxy, he 
offers a powerful defense of certain seminal orthodox doctrines which have been 
under recent attack. Hick unequivocally defends theological realism against the 
trend, starting at least with the "God is dead" movement, through non-cognitivist 
Wittgensteinian approaches to religion, and prominent now in the work of theolo-
gians such as Don Cupitt, to deny objective theism. Similarly, many contemporary 
theologians have either de-emphasized or jettisoned the notion of life after death, 
often on the grounds that an orientation towards life after death detracts from or 
even seriously damages how one views the moral and religious significance of 
one's present life. Here again, Hick is unequivocal, holding that life after death 
is an indispensable component of Christian theism, and that if it turned out to 
be false, Christian theism would thereby be falsified. (p. 123) In one of the most 
interesting-though as he himself admits, speculative-portions of his work, 
Hick attempts to bolster the intelligibility of life after death by working out a 
plausible scenario for post-mortem existence, particularly in view of the problem 
of evil. Starting from an IrenaeanlSchleiermachean soul-making theodicy, on 
which the present life would seem insufficient to prepare a person for salvation/lib-
eration, he integrates this with eastern notions of the possibility of a series of 
post-mortem lives, during which one's character can be further developed. Here 
he suggests that after death we might go through the sort of self-awareness and 
self-judgment bardo phase of existence articulated in the Tibetan Book of the 
Dead, in a manner which is commensurate with an eventual re-embodiment 
which Christians anticipate as the resurrection. 
Finally, one of the most significant advantages of Hick's scheme is the potential 
reply it offers to religious skepticism. Perhaps the most trenchant issue raised 
by religious pluralism is why we should think that the great world religions are 
all, in different ways, basically veridical, rather than being all basically false. 
Hick's contribution here is insightful and original because he is willing to take 
the risk of setting new theological directions. Quite obviously, the very fact of 
the enormous number and range of religious views held by humankind would 
seem to provide a good argument that there really is not anyone transcendent, 
divine Reality but just the collective hopes, desires, psychological projections, 
or whatever, of humanity. Precisely what Hick attempts to show is that the 
diversity of the world religions, which the thoughtful religious person cannot 
but face in the 20th century, can be most adequately understood as varied and 
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viable responses to the one transcendent, divine Reality. 
C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, by John Beversluis. Grand 
Rapids: William R. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1985. Pp. XIV + 182. 
$9.95 (paper). 
THOMAS V. MORRIS, University of Notre Dame. 
Not many good philosophers are great writers. Not many good writers are great 
philosophers. But an exceptional writer who addresses philosophical and religious 
topics with verve and style, whose books are well marketed, and who succeeds 
in touching people's lives can on occasion be acclaimed a great philosopher by 
the appreciative reading public who have benefited from his writing, a judgment 
which may sometimes be far out of line with the properly philosophical merits 
of his thought. 
Some professional philosophers find themselves with an ambivalent attitude 
toward such an author's success. While grateful for whatever good he has man-
aged to effect in the lives of his readers, they regret the confusion of rhetoric 
with philosophy pervading the public reception of his work. Other professional 
philosophers find themselves hardly ambivalent at all, but are just irked at the 
situation. Having worked hard at philosophy for years, having come to understand 
the difficulty of ever proving anything by pure reason alone, and having reconciled 
themselves to living with the uncertainties of this world, they are more than a 
little irritated to see their students and the general reading public idolizing some 
good writer as a great philosopher who has proved this, that, and everything 
else of real philosophical significance, when it is clear to a trained eye that no 
such results have been attained at all. The tone of his book indicates that this is 
precisely how John Beversluis perceives and reacts to the phenomenon of C. S. 
Lewis' extraordinary popularity as a Christian apologist and writer. 
This book actually begins with a measured, judicious, even appreciative tone 
of presentation. But it soon changes into a somewhat shrill, harsh, strident assault 
which ends up portraying Lewis as something of a pathetic figure whose blustery 
posturing as a rational apologist for Christian truth finally gave way at the end 
of his life to a desperate faith-against-all-odds held onto only by means of blatant 
philosophical inconsistency. Beversluis is concerned to blow the whistle on the 
Lewis myth, and as a professional guardian of philosophical truth, to protect the 
general public from Lewis' egregious logical errors. He says this of the Lewis 
reading public: 
The people to whom he primarily addresses himself are not trained in 
